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TO LEAN OR NOT TO LEAN AGAINST AN ASSET PRICE BUBBLE?
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ANASTASIOS EVGENIDIS and ANASTASIOS G. MALLIARIS
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, economists are reconsidering the
appropriate role of monetary policy towards equity bubbles. This paper contributes to
these deliberations by estimating the response of the stock market to monetary policy
tightening by using a Bayesian time-varying VAR model. By introducing the cyclically
adjusted price/earnings ratio, we propose a method that estimates its fundamental and
bubble components. We find that asset prices will initially fall and eventually rise again
but without the risk of feeding the bubble. Counterfactual policy experiments provide
additional evidence that monetary policy can lean against equity and housing prices.
(JEL E50, E52, E58)
I. INTRODUCTION
Considering the importance of financial sta-
bility for policymakers, the issue of whether
monetary policy may help achieve this goal is
crucial and hinges on the impact of monetary
policy on asset prices. This paper is motivated
by the Galí (2014) and Galí and Gambetti (2015)
papers, among several other important contri-
butions in the area of monetary policy, known
as “lean vs. clean.” The theoretical Galí (2014)
paper decomposes an asset price into its funda-
mental component and a bubble term. The fun-
damental component is the sum of present value
of future dividends discounted by some rate of
interest (denoted by i and determined by mone-
tary policy). When i increases, the fundamental
price decreases. This result is not controversial
because it follows from a discounting formula.
However, as Galí (2014) argues, the bubble com-
ponent has no payoffs to discount and this means
that any increase in i will tend to increase the
size of the bubble. This implies that tighter mone-
tary policy may actually further inflate the bubble
because increases in i decrease the fundamental
component but increase the bubble component of
the asset price.
Evgenidis: Assistant Professor, Newcastle University Busi-
ness School, Newcastle University, Newcastle University
Business School, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE, UK.
E-mail anastasios.evgenidis@ncl.ac.uk
Malliaris: Professor, Quinlan School of Business,
Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL 60611,
E-mail tmallia@luc.edu
Having Galí (2014) as a theoretical
construction, Galí and Gambetti (2015)
challenge the conventional assessment that
monetary policy can deflate a bubble by leaning
against it with interest rate increases. The authors
show that tightening monetary policy reduces
the fundamental value of the asset and inflates
the bubble component. Consequently, a sizable
increase in the interest rate, if the asset bubble
has increased substantially (and the fundamental
value declines only a little), may cause the lean-
ing against the bubble to actually further increase
the stock market’s value.
Three recent contributions now challenge
Galí (2014) and Galí and Gambetti (2015). First,
Allen, Barlevy, and Gale (2017) question the
assertion by Galí (2014) that in the case of ratio-
nal asset price bubbles the bubble component
must grow in equilibrium at the rate of interest.
Allen, Barlevy, and Gale (2017) show that when
they modify Galí’s model to allow for the possi-
bility that a central bank which raises the interest
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rate might crowd out resources that would have
otherwise been directed to the bubble, the Galí
result does not follow. Thus, the authors restore
the intuitive result that an increase in the inter-
est rate lowers both the fundamental and the
bubble components.
Second, Beckers and Bernoth (2016) also
challenge the theoretical predictions of Galí
by generalizing the concept of rational bubbles
to a broader idea of asset mispricing. They
also reassess the empirical findings of Galí and
Gambetti (2015) by employing a less restrictive
econometric strategy to identify monetary pol-
icy shocks and conclude that monetary policy
tightening lowers stock prices significantly.
Third, Blot, Hubert, and Labondance (2017) also
reassess Galí and Gambetti (2015) and empiri-
cally find that the effects of monetary policy on
asset bubbles are asymmetric. This means that
restrictive monetary policy cannot deflate asset
price bubbles whereas expansionary policies do
fuel such bubbles.
This paper contributes in four dimensions.
First, we examine the “lean” option by using
a Bayesian TV-VAR model. Instead of using
Galí and Gambetti’s (2015) controversial “ra-
tional bubble,” we introduce the cyclically
adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE) developed
by Campbell and Shiller (1998). This measure
is calculated by taking the price of the S&P
500 index and dividing by average inflation-
adjusted earnings from the previous 10 years.
The advantage of using CAPE is that this
P/E ratio moves slowly because of its 10-year
smoothing. More importantly, it is bounded with
a cyclical behavior that can be used at any point
in time to make a comparison of the current
price to past high and low values. The range of
these bounds changes over time to reflect the
evolution of financial markets but the anchoring
of CAPE on a 10-year earning average, further
adjusted for inflation, moderates the magnitude
of such changes. In contrast, when directly
using the S&P 500 index, (that was around
100 in 1971 and is over 3,200 in mid-January
2020), bubbly local peaks are eventually fol-
lowed by even higher ones, thus preventing any
benchmarking.
Galí (2014) imposes restrictive assumptions
that cannot easily be generalized, to guide cen-
tral bank initiatives. In our paper, by introduc-
ing CAPE and determining its bubbly range, we
investigate whether monetary policy can mod-
erate increases in CAPE. A priori, there are
three possibilities: increases in the federal funds
rate (FFR) would, (i) increase CAPE, which
would be consistent with Galí and Gambetti;
or (2) decrease CAPE or (3) perhaps show a
nonlinear response in view of CAPE’s long-
cyclical behavior. This third option, if confirmed
by the data can be viewed as a generaliza-
tion of the existing specialized version of up
or down responses to leaning against bubbles.
Our approach is not motivated by a theoretical
framework of bubble formation. Rather, we pro-
pose a CAPE derived threshold that allows us
to obtain an estimate of the bubble component
in order to measure what is a fair price for the
total stock market and how to use this to obtain
empirical implications.
The second contribution is to introduce an
additional tool for monetary policy. Constrained
by the zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve
(Fed) in the post-2008 period introduced uncon-
ventional monetary policy (UMP) measures in
the form of quantitative easing (QE) to stim-
ulate the economy. One of the risks of QE is
that very low borrowing costs and easy opportu-
nities to leverage a financial position may lead
to asset price bubbles and financial instability
upon their crash. This motivates our work to
use our TV-VAR model augmented with one
additional variable, the yield spread as the dif-
ference of the 10-Year Treasury Note rate less
the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, in order to esti-
mate the time-varying impact of UMP shocks on
asset prices.
The third contribution investigates whether
bubble formation is influenced by central bank
policies. Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016)
report that numerous bubbles have been fueled
by easy monetary policies. Bernanke and Kut-
tner (2005) find that a surprise cut in the policy
rate is associated with a 1% increase in stock
prices. Rigobon and Sack (2004) have a similar
result. A survey on similar topics is presented
in Claessens and Kose (2017). Our goal is to
explore this issue further by constructing coun-
terfactual scenarios via conditional forecasts.
We perform two different scenarios; one that
investigates the impact of conventional mon-
etary expansion on asset price bubbles and
another that examines the effects of QE on
asset prices.
The fourth contribution addresses housing
prices. There is much agreement that the Global
Financial Crisis was triggered by the bursting
of the housing bubble. However, there is no
agreement as to what had caused the housing
bubble. Later in the paper, we briefly discuss
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the main arguments developed by John Tay-
lor and Ben Bernanke to explain the causes
of the housing bubble. To empirically test
these arguments, we perform one last coun-
terfactual that allows us to assess whether a
strong contractionary monetary tightening could
have substantially shortened and reduced the
housing bubble.
We now provide a short overview of the main
results. Impulse response analysis presents evi-
dence of nonlinear effects of monetary policy on
both the stock market bubble and the fundamen-
tals. Specifically, there is a strong decline in asset
prices in the first 10 months after a tightening of
monetary policy, followed by a gradual increase
of the bubble term which tends towards zero in
the long term. Our result supports the conven-
tional wisdom regarding the impact of monetary
policy on stock price bubbles and contrasts with
the view that the size of the bubble increases
persistently in response to a tightening monetary
policy. Additionally, we examine the most recent
impact of UMP shocks on asset prices. We find
that such shocks push up asset prices, implying
that QE might trigger asset price bubbles and
financial instability.
Counterfactual policy scenarios help to illu-
minate these issues by examining whether the
appearance of bubbles is influenced by mone-
tary policy. Our results suggest that aggressive
monetary tightening, in the form of interest rate
increases in the period before the burst of the
dotcom bubble, would have limited the sharp
stock market expansion. More recently, exten-
sive implementation of QE did lead to inflated
asset prices for a protracted period. Lastly, con-
sidering the impact of monetary policy on the
housing market, scenario analysis suggests that
if the Fed had responded much more aggressively
in 2003–2004 by adopting a frontloaded policy,
it would have substantially reduced the rise in
house prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II offers a review of the relevant
literature. Section III provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the data and the econometric methodol-
ogy used. Section IV presents and discusses the
results. Section V concludes by briefly summa-
rizing the contributions made in this paper on the
debate of “lean vs. clean.”
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The classic book that first addressed
the importance of asset price bubbles is
Kindleberger (1978). From the first edition of
this book, through its several revisions, up to the
last version by Kindleberger and Aliber (2015),
new bubbles were added to illustrate their con-
tinued presence in the economic landscape.
What emerges from these books is that asset
bubbles have been occurring for the past few
centuries across many countries. Often, they
cause limited macroeconomic problems but in
certain occurrences these bubbles may lead to
an economic depression, as in the case of the
1929 Stock Market Bubble Crash or to a major
recession as in the 2007 U.S. housing market
bubble crash. Central banks are concerned with
asset bubbles because of the risks associated with
their crashes. Kashyap and Siegert (2020) argue
that stretched asset valuations also matter for
financial stability.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) offer a more
comprehensive quantitative analysis of eco-
nomic crises than that of Kindleberger (1978).
The scope of their book is chronologically
very long, going back to pre-1800, and broad
in terms of countries, covering as many as
66 countries. Crises of various varieties are
examined, such as inflation, currency crashes,
banking crises, sovereign debt crises, and oth-
ers. Many economic crises are unrelated to
asset price bubbles, but the authors describe
how some banking crises developed from the
bursting of stock market bubbles or housing
bubbles.
A more technical debate about asset price
bubbles and monetary policy was launched by
Greenspan (1996), then Federal Reserve Chair-
man, who was the first to clearly state the chal-
lenge faced by central banks in the presence of
asset price bubbles. A large number of papers
were motivated by Greenspan (1996). Bernanke
and Gertler (1999, 2001) argued that the pursuit
of price stability contributes to financial stability
and therefore central banks should ignore asset
bubbles. Evanoff, Kaufman, and Malliaris (2012)
offer an overview of the literature on asset bub-
bles with an emphasis on the Global Financial
Crisis. By now, there are major reviews, such
as Jones (2015), Claessens and Kose (2017), and
Evanoff and Malliaris (2018) which trace the
evolution of ideas on the topic of bubbles and
monetary policy. Also, it was quickly agreed
that asset bubbles that matter to monetary pol-
icy are stock market aggregates and housing or
real estate aggregates. Price bubbles that carry an
inconsequential risk to impact the real economy
in a significant way such as individual stocks,
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commodities, regional housing, or currencies, are
not considered by central banks.
During the decade of 1996–2007, while
researchers were addressing, both theoretically
and empirically, bubble related questions, the
U.S. economy went through the building up of
the internet bubble, its bursting, a brief eco-
nomic recession, and another bubble, this time
in housing, during 2002–2007. Jones (2015)
gives a thoughtful discussion of the literature
during this period and the consensus that slowly
developed. Issing (2011) called it the Jackson
Hole consensus that endorsed the “clean after
the bubble bursting” choice. The brief and low
cost recession that followed the internet bub-
ble crash during the 8-month period of March
2001 to November 2001, motivated Blinder and
Reis (2005) to state: If the mopping-up strategy
worked this well after the mega-bubble burst in
2000, shouldn’t we assume that it will also work
well after other, presumably smaller, bubbles
burst in the future? Our suggested answer is
apparent.
It is now known, from the painful costs
of the Great Recession that resulted from the
bursting of the housing bubble, that the Blinder
and Reis (2005) suggested answer for inac-
tion during the growth of an asset bubble was
shortsighted. Kohn (2006), Mishkin (2008),
Dudley (2010), Jones (2015), Yellen (2014),
Malliaris (2012, 2016), and Claessens and
Kose (2017) evaluate how the Global Financial
Crisis impacted the “clean vs. lean” literature and
how during the last 10 years, researchers have
focused on the “leaning” choice. Brunnermeier
and Schnabel (2016) empirically document that
central banks have fueled asset price bubbles
repeatedly over time and across countries. Their
evidence supports that central banks are not
asset bubble-neutral. Some evidence of the
bubble non-neutrality of central banks is also
offered by Hayford and Malliaris (2001, 2004).
Thus, if central banks are not bubble-neutral
but instead contribute to bubble development,
they have two choices: To lean against the
bubbles they produce, or to clean after the burst-
ing. Furthermore, since central banks and the
Fed in particular, chose not to lean against the
housing bubble and bore the huge risks of the
Great Recession, should leaning against a future
bubble be preferable to cleaning? It is at this
phase of the heated examination that Galí (2014)
and Galí and Gambetti (2015) dispute of the
effectiveness of monetary policy to lean against
a bubble.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Data
As mentioned above, one chief difference
between Galí and Gambetti (2015) and our paper
is the use of CAPE. Galí and Gambetti (2015)
rely on a theoretical model to decompose the
stock market price into fundamental and bub-
ble components that respond in exactly opposite
ways to an increase in the Fed funds rate. Namely,
the fundamental component declines while the
bubble component increases. We admit that the
profession currently does not have an acceptable
model to decompose an asset price but could
use a valuation proxy such as CAPE. CAPE has
lower and upper bounds from about 5 to 45.
CAPE, as indicated earlier is a cyclically adjusted
price/earnings ratio that is calculated by taking
the price of the S&P 500 index and dividing by an
average inflation-adjusted earnings from the pre-
vious 10 years. By construction, CAPE has mini-
mized noise because of its averaging of earnings
over a 10-year period and also because of exclud-
ing the influence of inflation.
To construct the bubble series, we begin with
a given CAPE level and calculate a 10-year mov-
ing average plus 1.5 times this moving average’s
standard deviation as a threshold for over- and
under-valuation.1 We propose a 10-year CAPE to
be consistent with Shiller’s logic that a 10-year
period average for the Shiller P/E can account for
cyclical adjustments for the highly volatile stock
prices. If, in a given month, the CAPE value is
greater than its 10-year moving average plus 1.5
times this 10-year standard deviation, we call this
over-valuation or bubble and is equal to CAPE
minus threshold. We consider the fundamental
CAPE to be the actual CAPE less the bubble
component. On the other hand, we define under-
valuation or negative bubble, as the quantity of
CAPE below its threshold which, again, is cal-
culated as the difference between CAPE and the
threshold. The meaning of a negative bubble is
that there is a negative mispricing. The construc-
tion of the bubble component as both positive
and negative values enriches our data and our
analysis to capture the asymmetries argued by
Greenspan (1996) and Issing (2009, 2011). The
fundamental asymmetry between the stock mar-
ket and monetary policy is this: when the stock
1. A much lower threshold, for instance 1 standard devi-
ation, would produce too many equity bubble periods while
a much higher one, such as 2 standard deviation, would give
only a few bubble periods. Thus, we choose 1.5 as the average
between too low and very high.
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FIGURE 1
CAPE and Threshold
FIGURE 2
Bubble Component
market declines or crashes, monetary policy does
not hesitate to implement an easy monetary pol-
icy; however, when the market grows euphor-
ically for several months, monetary policy is
less decisive.
Figures 1 and 2 convey similar information.
Figure 1 illustrates the original CAPE index
together with the calculated threshold index and
Figure 2 shows the bubble series.2 In Figure 1,
note that when CAPE (solid line) is above the
threshold (dashed line), we detect positive bub-
bles; when CAPE is below the threshold, we
detect negative bubbles. Correspondingly in
Figure 2, when the bubble component crosses
above zero, we identify bubble periods; when it
crosses below zero, we identify negative bubbles.
The results suggest that our proposed method
identifies both historical episodes of exuberance
that took place over the period examined. In par-
ticular, the figures demonstrate the overpricing
or bubbly period of 1995–2001 and for those
who remember the October 19, 1987 one-day
correction of about 20%, the graph illustrates the
2. The graph of the fundamental component is con-
structed as the difference between the actual CAPE less the
bubble component is included in the Appendix, Support-
ing information.
presence of a brief bubble prior to its crashing. It
is worth noting that our bubbly periods coincide
with the ones detected by some well-developed
bubble detection mechanisms in the economet-
rics literature. Specifically, econometric tests per-
formed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015) identified
periods of exuberance in the market including
the Black Monday and the dot-com bubble. Par-
ticularly in relation to the dot-com bubble, their
strategy detects mildly explosive market behav-
ior 5 years before the market crashes, exactly as
shown in Figure 2.
Also, note that the Global Financial Crisis of
2007–2009 was not preceded by a bubble in the
stock market as judged by the CAPE and our pro-
posed threshold. This is true because the cycli-
cally adjusted 10-year real earnings remained sta-
ble while the stock market as measured by the
S&P 500 was growing at a moderate rather than
exuberant rate. This finding is also consistent
with the tests performed by Phillips, Shi, and
Yu (2015), which do not identify the subprime
mortgage crisis in 2009 as a bubble expansion.
Additional evidence is provided by Phillips,
Wu, and Yu (2011), where the exuberant behav-
ior in the Nasdaq stock market is very similar to
the bubble periods as identified in Figure 2. In
particular, Phillips, Wu, and Yu’s (2011) recur-
sive ADF tests for the log real Nasdaq price index
detects for the first time in July 1995 the pres-
ence of exuberance in the data. The evidence in
support of price exuberance becomes stronger
from that point on until September 2000. After
that date, there is little evidence of exuberance in
the data, as in our paper. Also, Phillips, Shi and
Yu’s recursive ADF tests for the real Nasdaq price
index detects some explosive behavior before the
1987 crash although it is short-lived. In particular,
the exuberance starts in 1986 and ends in Septem-
ber 1987. Again, the duration of the bubble period
as identified in their paper is very similar to the
one observed in Figure 2.3
One final comment regarding Figures 1 and 2.
Notice that since the end of the last recession
(in June 2009), the S&P 500 index has grown
faster than the cyclically adjusted real earnings
and in 2017, the index is in a bubbly state.
This latter evidence highlights the ability of our
proposed method to capture the longevity and
resilience of high asset prices observed in the last
years.
3. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggest-
ing the papers of Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) and Phillips,
Shi, and Yu (2015) that provide supporting evidence for
our methodology.
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Our model includes the following five vari-
ables: industrial production index (IP), producer
price index (PPI), the FFR controlled by the
Fed and the two CAPE components described
above. IP and PPI indices are used as the pri-
mary target variables of monetary policy. Given
that the ultimate goal of monetary policy is to
achieve price stability, we use the PPI index as
a key variable to evaluate the impact of mone-
tary policy on prices. Regarding the proxy for
the business cycle, data on GDP are not avail-
able on a monthly basis, therefore we use IP as
a measure of economic activity. We use monthly
data for the period 1960:01 up to 2017:12. Our
macroeconomic variables are taken from the Fed-
eral Reserve Economic Database while CAPE is
taken from Shiller’s online database. IP and PPI
are transformed in log-levels, while no transfor-
mation is implemented for the FFR and the CAPE
components.
B. Empirical Model
We examine our reflections as described in
Section II with reference to the first two contri-
butions by adopting a TV-VAR model. We use
a TV-VAR as it allows us to grasp the possible
changes in the underlying structure of the U.S.
macroeconomy and also, to take into account the
fact that the overall effect of a change in mone-
tary policy in stock prices may have changed over
time as the size of the bubble changes. Consider
the following form:
Yt = B0,t + B1,tYt−1 + · · · + Bp,tYt−p + ϵt,(1)
ϵt ∼ N(0,Ωt),
where Yt contains the vector of r endogenous
variables, p denotes the lag length that is set equal
to four based on information criteria, B0, t is a
r × 1 vector referring to the constant terms, Bi, t
is the r × r matrix which contains the lags of the
endogenous variables and 𝜖
𝜏
is an r × 1 vector
of white noise process distributed as i.i.d, with
Ωt being the covariance matrix. Following Prim-
iceri (2005), the time varying covariance matrix
Ωt is decomposed as follows:
(2) Ωt = A−1t Ht(A
−1
t )
′
,
where the matrix Ht is a diagonal matrix of the
stochastic volatilities and the matrix At is a lower
triangular matrix which captures the contempora-
neous interactions of the endogenous variables.
Both time-varying matrices are defined as fol-
lows:
(3) Ht =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
h1,t 0 0 0 0
0 h2,t 0 0 0
0 0 h3,t 0 0
0 0 0 h4,t 0
0 0 0 0 h5,t
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
and
(4) At =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 0 0 0 0
a21,t 1 0 0 0
a31,t a32,t 1 0 0
a41,t a42,t a43,t 1 0
a51,t a52,t a53,t a54,t 1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
where hi, t evolve as geometric random walks:
(5) lnht = lnht−1 + νt.
Following Primiceri (2005), we postulate the
coefficients Bi, t and the non-zero and non-one
elements of the matrix At to evolve as driftless
random walks:
(6) Bt = Bt−1 + ηt.
(7) at = at−1 + τt.
Furthermore, we assume that the vector
[𝜖t, 𝜂t, 𝜏 t, 𝜈t]
′
is distributed as:
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
ϵt
ηt
τt
νt
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
∼ N(0,V),with V =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Ω 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 Z
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
and
(8)
Z =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
σ21 0 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0 0
0 0 σ23 0 0
0 0 0 σ24 0
0 0 0 0 σ25
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
.
Identification of Structural Shocks. To identify
monetary policy shocks we follow the relative
literature on the monetary policy transmission
(see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999
among others), by adopting a recursive ordering
of the variables based on the Cholesky decom-
position of the VAR covariance matrix as Ω =
A0A
′
0, where A0 represents a time-varying struc-
tural impact matrix (which is not necessarily
lower triangular).
The ordering of our macroeconomic and
financial variables is fairly standard in the lit-
erature and implies that slow-moving variables
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FIGURE 3
FFR Response to an FFR Shock
(economic activity and prices) are assumed to
not respond contemporaneously to unanticipated
changes in monetary policy. In contrast, fast-
moving variables (asset prices) are allowed to
respond contemporaneously to monetary policy
shocks (Bernanke and Kuttner 2005). Therefore,
the FFR is ordered after economic activity and
inflation. This assumption is based on the belief
that the transmission of monetary policy shocks
to the real economy is evident only with a lag. In
addition, the FFR is ordered before CAPE com-
ponents, implying that monetary policy shocks
influence stock prices instantaneously but not
vice versa, that is, the central bank does not react
contemporaneously to idiosyncratic changes in
the stock market. Our baseline specification is
thus consistent with Furlanetto (2011) who finds
that in the United States, the monetary policy
response to asset prices shocks declines over time
and becomes statistically insignificant during
the bubble period of 2003–2007. The impulse
responses can be sensitive to a different identifi-
cation scheme that considers the possibility that
the Fed does react contemporaneously to stock
price surprises. Thus, we test the robustness of
our results when sign restrictions are applied (see
robustness checks in Section V).
Estimation. The model in Equations (1)–(8) is
estimated using the Bayesian methods described
by Kim and Nelson (1999). In particular, we
employ a Gibbs sampling algorithm that approx-
imates the posterior distribution. A description of
the prior and posterior distributions is given in
the technical Appendix 1. Here we summarize
the basic algorithm, which involves the following
steps:
1. The VAR coefficients Bi, t and the off-
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix At
are simulated by using the methods described in
Carter and Kohn (1994).
2. The volatilities of the reduced-form shocks
Ht are drawn using the date-by-date blocking
scheme in Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994).
3. The hyperparameters Q and S are drawn
from an inverse Wishart distribution, while the
elements of Z are simulated from an inverse
gamma distribution.
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A. The Impact of FFR on the Macroeconomy
and Stock Markets
Figures 3–7 show the responses of our five
variables to a policy rate increase generated by
the TV-VAR model. We use the first 5 years to
train our sample, therefore the figures depict the
responses from 1966 up to 2017.
Figure 3 shows the response of the FFR, the
variable that is shocked. The figure shows the
increase of the FFR by 100 basis points in the
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FIGURE 4
Response of Industrial Production to an FFR Shock
FIGURE 5
Response of Prices to an FFR Shock
first period that dies out smoothly in the fol-
lowing months. Figure 4 displays the response
of industrial production. Note that generally, a
contractionary monetary policy leads to a notice-
able decrease in IP as would be expected. There
is some evidence of time-variation, as indicated
by the more intense decline of IP until the late
1970s, compared to the impact of the shock in the
post-1980s period, which seems to be smaller in
magnitude. This is due to the effect of the Great
Moderation which contained low and stable infla-
tion and which signaled a period of significant
decline in macroeconomic volatility.
Figure 5 depicts the impulse responses of
prices. Broadly speaking, the tightening of
monetary policy appears to lead to a substantial
1966 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
FIGURE 6
Response of the Fundamental Component to an FFR Shock
FIGURE 7
Response of the Bubble Component to an FFR Shock
and persistent decline in prices after a small
positive reaction for a short period as a result
of the shock. This behavior of inflation is con-
sistent with the conventional view of the lag
effect of monetary policy under which monetary
changes take much longer to affect prices than
output. Regarding the time-varying nature of
the response, similar to the IP response, there is
evidence of an increased impact on prices in the
1970s consistent with the great inflation period
characterized by high and persistent inflation,
coupled with recessions. In addition, starting
from the early 1990s onward, we observe that
the initial rise is becoming more and more
shortened with prices below zero declining
faster.
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We next turn our attention on the responses
of the CAPE components. Figures 6 and 7 show
the responses of the fundamental and the bub-
ble components correspondingly. As expected,
there is a significant drop of the fundamental
component following the contractionary policy
shock as the latter decreases future economic
growth and thus firms’ profitability and future
dividend payouts. The most interesting result
however comes from Figure 7 which suggests
a similar, clear reduction of the bubble compo-
nent in response to the shock. Taking both results
together, the implication is that CAPE falls, offer-
ing a contrast with the Galí and Gambetti (2015)
evidence of an increase in CAPE due to grow-
ing bubbles.
Focusing on the bubble term, note that its
strong decline is reversed almost a year after
the shock, as we observe a gradual increase of
the bubble term which tends towards zero in the
medium term. This implies that a contractionary
monetary policy initially decreases stock mar-
ket prices, which eventually resume their growth.
This finding highlights the nonlinear nature of the
CAPE response, suggesting that asset prices will
initially fall and eventually rise again but with-
out the risk of feeding the bubble. Our finding
also contrasts with the Galí and Gambetti (2015)
result in which the observed pattern of the bubble
increases persistently through the sample period
in response to a contractionary monetary shock.
Overall, our analysis supports the conventional
wisdom regarding the impact of monetary policy
on stock price bubbles and contrasts with the view
that the size of the bubble increases persistently
in response to a tightening monetary policy.
Robustness Checks. We re-estimate our model
by using an alternative identification scheme. As
explained above, the traditional Cholesky identi-
fication that we use assumes that monetary policy
shocks influence stock prices instantaneously but
that the central bank does not react contempo-
raneously to idiosyncratic changes in the stock
market. There is however another strand of litera-
ture (Bjørnland and Leitemo 2009; Rigobon and
Sack 2003) which argues that the Fed reacts to
changes in stock market. Thus, we seek to test the
robustness of our results by considering a differ-
ent identification scheme that is a mix of long-run
restrictions as in Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009),
augmented with sign restrictions following Arias,
Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner (2018) and Bin-
ning (2013). Essentially, we allow for two-way
contemporaneous responses between the stock
market and the policy rate. The identification is
described next.
We start by assuming that industrial produc-
tion and inflation do not respond contemporane-
ously to contractionary monetary policy shocks.
This assumption mirrors the restrictions implied
in Cholesky decomposition and is based on the
belief that the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to the real economy is evident only with
a lag. On the other hand, we allow the funda-
mental component to decrease on impact while
the bubble component is also allowed to respond,
yet the sign of the response is left unrestricted.
The imposed sign on the fundamental component
is motivated by the economic theory (see Beck-
ers and Bernoth 2016) which predicts a decrease
of the fundamental component of share prices
in response to a contractionary monetary pol-
icy shock, since the latter decreases future eco-
nomic growth and thus firms’ profitability and
future dividend payouts. Note that an oppos-
ing effect may appear if market participants are
less informed about the future path of output
and inflation than the policymakers. Within our
context however, we assume that market partic-
ipants and the Fed share the same information
set and thus we identify monetary policy shocks
that can be interpreted as standard Taylor-rule
type shocks.
In addition, following Bjørnland and Leit-
emo (2009), we interpret an increase in the bub-
ble component as a stock price shock in the form
of a non-fundamental shock that is motivated by
speculative behavior.4 We assume that this shock
has no immediate effect on economic activity
or inflation, and that the sign of the response
of the fundamental component is left uncon-
strained. Similarly, monetary policy is allowed
to respond to the stock price shock, yet the sign
of the response is left unrestricted. Last, follow-
ing Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), we assume
that monetary policy does not have any long-run
effects on economic activity and stock prices.
Overall, we find that the results (reported in
Appendix A.3, Supporting information) are not
affected by this alternative identification scheme.
We note a persistent decline in industrial pro-
duction and PPI throughout the sample period
in response to a tightening of monetary pol-
icy, whereas the initial decline of the bubble
4. Note that for a robustness check, we also assume an
increase in the fundamental component as a stock price shock
that is motivated by the arrival of news regarding the future
path of macroeconomic fundamentals. Results (not reported
but available upon request) are largely unaffected.
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component (and the fundamental) in response
to the shock is followed by a gradual increase
which tends towards zero at the end of the fore-
cast horizon.
We perform a series of other robustness
checks. We first estimate different versions
of our baseline model by considering varia-
tions of our proposed threshold for over- and
under-valuation. In particular, we consider two
versions where we calculate an 8-year and a
12-year moving average (instead of 10-year)
plus 1.5 times this moving average’s standard
deviation as a threshold. We also consider two
more versions where we calculate a 10-year
moving average plus 1.2 and plus 1.8 (instead
of 1.5) times this moving average’s standard
deviation as a threshold. As a last robustness
check, we investigate whether the inclusion of a
different inflation variable alters our results. In
this case, we include the consumer price index
instead of the PPI. The responses of the bubble
component under all five robustness checks are
depicted in Appendix A.3, Supporting informa-
tion. In all cases, results are largely unchanged,
pointing to a decline of the bubble component
in response to the shock, followed by a gradual
increase which tends towards zero at the end of
the forecast horizon.
B. The Impact of UMP on the Macroeconomy
and Stock Markets
The analysis above has focused on whether
monetary policy surprises drive bubbles. How-
ever, in the post-2008 period the Fed responded
to the worsening economic crisis by cutting its
policy rate to nearly zero, where it remained until
late 2015. Constrained by the zero lower bound,
the Fed used UMP tools such as QE (or large-
scale asset purchases) to stimulate the economy.
As part of this policy, the Fed purchased gov-
ernment bonds by issuing central bank money.
QE can affect demand in a number of ways. One
of the main channels of transmission is the port-
folio balance channel. As the price of the long-
term bonds and related financial assets increases,
demand is stimulated through wealth effects and
lower borrowing costs. However, the risk here is
that very low borrowing costs and easy opportu-
nities to leverage a financial position may lead to
asset price bubbles and financial instability.
Following Kapetanios et al. (2012), we
measure the impact of such UMP shocks by
including in the TV-VAR one additional vari-
able, the spread between the 10-year Treasury
Note and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate. In
order to identify UMP shocks we use the sign
restrictions scheme proposed by Kapetanios
et al. (2012) and Baumeister and Benati (2013),
according to which an expansionary yield spread
shock leads to a contemporaneous decrease in
the yield spread, rises in inflation, IP and the
fundamental CAPE, but leaves the policy rate
unchanged. In contrast, an expansionary con-
ventional monetary policy shock decreases the
policy rate and results in rises in IP, inflation and
the fundamental CAPE.
We shall also highlight that we estimate two
other versions of the benchmark model (results
not depicted here but are available upon request)
in order to provide alternative identifications of
UMP shocks. In the first specification, we add the
Fed’s balance sheet to identify monetary policy
shocks while in the second specification, we fol-
low Wu and Xia (2016) by using the shadow rate
as a measure for the stance of monetary policy.
The responses from both alternative estimations
of UMP shocks are largely unchanged compared
to the benchmark model.
The sample spans the period from 2003:01
up to 2017:12 to be consistent with the period
during which the Fed’s balance sheet and the
shadow rate data are available. We use the first
60 observations as a training sample with the esti-
mation carried out starting in January 2008, when
the Fed intervened by lowering the main refi-
nancing interest rate until the zero lower bound
became binding a few months later. The esti-
mated responses of IP, prices and the bubble com-
ponent are shown in Figures 8–10.5
Figure 8 shows that UMP shocks lead to a
gradual increase in industrial production. Also,
note that the pattern of the IP responses to
the shock has changed little over time. Regard-
ing inflation, we observe a similar behavior.
The responses display a positive and progres-
sive increase following the yield spread reduc-
tion. One can also notice that in terms of magni-
tude, the increase of inflation responses is more
intense until 2014, whereas after that date the
impact of the shock has been shortened. This is
possibly due to the fact that asset purchases were
halted in 2014. Overall, consistent with the lit-
erature (Baumeister and Benati 2013; Evgenidis
and Salachas 2019; Weale and Wieladek 2016),
5. Responses of the FFR, the yield spread and the funda-
mental are not reported to save space but can be provided upon
request. The fundamental component increases in response to
an UMP shock, as expected.
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FIGURE 8
Response of IP to a Yield Spread Reduction
FIGURE 9
Response of Prices to a Yield Spread Reduction
our findings highlight the importance of UMP
in propelling economic recovery and preventing
disinflationary pressures. We also offer evidence
which supports the conclusion that the asset pur-
chases program has been effective and decisive in
averting problematic macroeconomic outcomes
in the United States.
Our analysis turns now to the impact of UMP
shocks on asset prices as denoted by the bubble
component (Figure 10). The result is interest-
ing since it highlights that the bubble response
exhibits different patterns. In particular, note
that initially the response decreases substantially
on impact. However, immediately after, there is
a gradual increase that becomes positive 2–3
months following the shock. The positive reac-
tion of the bubble component is not surprising
given that one of the possible ways through which
QE aims to stimulate the economy is by push-
ing up asset prices. This implies that a persistent
increase in CAPE due to extensive QE might trig-
ger asset price bubbles and financial instability.
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FIGURE 10
Response of the Bubble Component to a Yield Spread Reduction
We explore this possibility in more detail in the
next section.
C. Scenario Analysis—The Role of Monetary
Policy in Asset Price Bubbles
In the following two sections we conduct
several counterfactual policy experiments in
order to investigate whether central bank policies
might have fuelled asset and housing bubbles. In
order to produce forecasts, we follow Kapetanios
et al. (2012), Meyer and Zaman (2013), and
Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) and rely
on a time-invariant Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
version of the model presented in 3.2 (i.e., the
parameters in 1 are not allowed to vary over-
time).6 Details on the estimation of the BVAR as
well as the conditional forecasts are provided in
the technical Appendix 2.
6. First, a disadvantage of the time-varying VAR
approaches is that their predictions are highly inaccurate com-
pared to those from time invariant BVAR models. Specifi-
cally, Kapetanios et al. (2012) show that time varying VAR
models produce poor forecasts. According to the authors, this
may be because agents in these models learn very slowly. For
example, if the initial point of the forecast is in a downturn,
agents will remain pessimistic for a long period despite the
potential monetary policy stimulus. To confirm this, we esti-
mate the counterfactuals in Sections C and D by using the
TV-VAR model instead of the BVAR. Results (not reported
here but available upon request) suggest that the projections
are highly inaccurate compared to the actual data.
Another reason why TV-VARs are not suitable for our
experiments in Sections C and D is that they can capture sig-
nificant changes in monetary policy regimes, and they are
also consistent with deviations from the rational expectations
We carry out out-of-sample forecasts condi-
tional on an assumed path of policy variables.7
We perform two different experiments: one that
investigates the impact on asset prices of a con-
ventional monetary expansion and another that
examines the effects from QE. For the first exper-
iment, we use the same variables as in Section A
with the only difference being that, as we are
hypothesis. This implies that agents use simple forecasting
rules to form their projections about the evolution of macroe-
conomic variables. Taken together, the previous two argu-
ments suggest that TV-VARs seem particularly plausible dur-
ing crisis and postcrisis periods. This is because during these
periods significant changes in monetary policy regimes take
place. Agents have no idea how various shocks have changed
the structure of the economy thus they use “rules of thumb”
to obtain information about the new state. During the recent
financial crisis for example, where the Fed introduced for the
first time nonstandard monetary policy tools such as quan-
titative easing, it would make sense for the agents to depart
from the rational expectation hypothesis and use simple fore-
casting models to learn about the new state of the economy.
Note however that the estimation period of the counterfactuals
that we build in Sections C and D excludes the crisis and the
postcrisis years during which the Fed undertook the massive
asset purchases that led the amount of Treasuries in its bal-
ance sheet to $1.6 trillion. This renders TV-VARs unsuitable
for this analysis.
7. Following Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2015), we
implicitly assume in these experiments that the counterfactual
forecast paths involve shocks small enough not to violate the
Lucas (1976) critique. Indeed, the disturbances that we create
in the system in the form of scenario assumptions are not
too big to provoke a significant change in the behavior of
economic agents which could in turn, change the underlying
structure of the economy and thus the estimated parameters.
See also Kilian and Lewis (2011) and references in their paper
for an analysis of this issue.
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FIGURE 11
Counterfactuals; the Impact of a Strong Monetary Tightening on Asset Prices
interested in producing CAPE forecasts, we con-
sider CAPE instead of its components. The model
is estimated from 1960:01 up to 1997:03 and
then is used to perform two conditional fore-
casts until 1999:05. The period that is used
in our counterfactual experiment coincides with
the historical increase observed in CAPE due
to the emergence and persistence of the equity
asset price bubble, which, a few months later
collapsed, destabilizing the US economy. The
first conditional forecast assumes that the FFR
equals its observed value over the forecast hori-
zon, let us call it the actual path. The second
conditional forecast, the counterfactual scenario,
assumes that the path of the FFR is higher than
observed by 200 basis points over the forecast
horizon. This implies a prolonged contractionary
policy. The difference between the two condi-
tional forecasts captures the potential impact that
a tightening monetary policy would have had on
asset prices.
In a similar vein, we estimate another BVAR
model to perform our second experiment; this
time to examine the recent impact of QE on asset
prices. For this model, we use the same vari-
ables as in Section B with the only difference
being that we consider CAPE instead of its com-
ponents. Following Kapetanios et al. (2012), we
assume that QE affects the economy by reducing
the yield spread by 100 basis points. The VAR
model is estimated from 1960:01 until 2010:03
and then is used to carry out two conditional
forecasts up to 2014:04. The actual path assumes
that the yield spread follows its historical values
while the counterfactual considers that the path of
the yield spread is higher than the actual by 100
basis points over the forecast horizon. This can be
considered as quantitative tightening (QT). Addi-
tionally, we set the short-term interest rate to its
observed value over the forecast horizon so that
our counterfactual experiment takes into account
the fact that QT is conducted in the zero lower
bound environment. As before, we are interested
in the difference between the two conditional
forecasts, which in this case shows whether QE
has contributed in fueling asset prices. Figures 11
and 12 show the results of the two counterfac-
tual experiments. Each figure shows the actual
data for the CAPE (solid line), together with the
median conditional forecast under the actual path
(dash-dotted line) and the counterfactual scenario
(dashed line).
Figure 11 suggests that the forecast of CAPE
under the actual policy implemented is much
higher compared to the forecast under the coun-
terfactual experiment. This result is even more
interesting when one considers that the actual
FFR prevailed at the period in which our forecast-
ing experiment is conducted was relatively stable,
at around 5%. Therefore, this finding indicates
that if the Fed had followed a tougher contrac-
tionary policy during that period, it would have
reduced the asset price bubble and thus it would
have probably mitigated the impact of the inter-
net bubble.
Figure 12 shows that the forecast distribution
associated with the counterfactual QT scenario
is lower than the forecast under the actual QE
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FIGURE 12
Counterfactuals; the Impact of QE on Asset Prices
policy implemented. This pattern is evident for
the whole forecasting period. Our finding sug-
gests some evidence for the hypothesis that the
massive asset purchases under QE from 2010 to
2014 sent asset prices to high levels for a pro-
longed period of time, thus, raising concerns of
the appearance of asset price bubbles. Taking the
evidence of the two experiments together, we
conclude that an aggressive monetary tightening,
that is, leaning against the bubble, would have
limited the sharp stock market expansion in the
late 1990s while extensive implementation of QE
more recently would have led to inflated asset
prices for a protracted period.
D. Scenario Analysis—The Role of Monetary
Policy in Housing Bubbles
We remarked earlier that central banks need
to be concerned with stock market and hous-
ing bubbles because their bursting significantly
reduces wealth and investments. Having ana-
lyzed the impact of monetary policy on the
stock market, we now analyze the housing bub-
ble of 2004–2007. Taylor (2007) argues that the
Greenspan Fed kept FFR too low for too long
and such a policy fueled the housing bubble.
Taylor (2007) of course realizes that subprime
mortgages, regular mortgages with both fixed and
variable interest rates, innovations in mortgage
backed securitizations, inaccurate assessments by
credit rating agencies, hedging by credit default
swaps, government policies encouraging hous-
ing ownership and numerous other factors, all
contributed to the housing bubble. However, he
chooses to focus on monetary policy to illus-
trate that substantial deviations of monetary pol-
icy from the Taylor rule confirm the reluctance of
the Fed to lean against the housing bubble.
Bernanke (2010) gives a long and careful
debate to Taylor. The central thesis of Bernanke
is that the housing market was driven by low
long-term interest rates that stimulated the high
demand for mortgages and housing ownership.
These long-term interest rates were not impacted
by the central bank’s FFR policies. Bernanke
emphasizes that the central bank has limited
influence on long-term interest rates and pro-
poses that these rates were low, not because of
an easy monetary policy but rather because of
a global glut of savings, with China being the
primary source (see also Wachter 2015 for a
concise description of explanations offered in the
literature for the housing bubble).
To examine whether the absence of a strong
contractionary monetary tightening in 2003 and
2004 might have fueled the housing bubble, we
perform the following experiments. We estimate
a BVAR by including IP, PPI, FFR, CAPE and
one extra variable, Shiller’s national home price
index. The model is estimated from 1987:01, as
this is the earliest available date for the home
price index, up to 2002:12. The model then is
used to perform two counterfactual policy sce-
narios, from 2003:01 until 2004:06. We choose
this period since first, it allows us to investigate
Taylor’s argument in favor of a monetary tighten-
ing that should have happened during these years,
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FIGURE 13
Counterfactual Paths for FFR
and second, this period coincides with the emer-
gence and persistence of the housing bubble in
the United States.
In our first counterfactual, we adopt an exper-
iment close to the spirit of Taylor (2007) by
assuming that the FFR follows an incremental
adjustment by 20 basis points. In our second
counterfactual, we assume a frontloaded policy,
that is, hikes in the FFR concentrated in the
beginning and policy stabilizing thereafter. Note
that in both cases, the actual path assumes that
the FFR follows its historical values. Figure 13
shows the two different counterfactual paths for
the FFR. Note that the actual policy (solid line)
in the period during which our counterfactuals
take place, was loosening than contractionary, as
the FFR fluctuated at very low levels and the Fed
never raised it. Figures 14 and 15 show the results
of the simulations using the two different counter-
factual scenarios. The solid line shows the histor-
ical data, the dash-dotted line shows the median
forecast under the actual path and the dashed line
depicts the median forecast under the counterfac-
tual scenario.
As Figure 14 reveals, evidence that house
prices were systematically different under a pol-
icy of incremental adjustments in FFR appears to
be negligible. On the contrary, Figure 15 shows
that the forecast distribution associated with the
alternative counterfactual scenario is lower than
the forecast under the actual policy implemented.
This pattern is particularly evident from mid-
2003 onwards.
Our results indicate that the policy strategy
does matter when the Fed seeks to mitigate hous-
ing booms. In particular, a frontloaded monetary
policy normalization would have avoided much
of the housing boom as opposed to an incremen-
tal rise in the FFR. Hence, the actual low rates
set at that time did fuel the housing bubble and
as the model shows, had the Fed responded much
more aggressively in 2003, it would have substan-
tially reduced the rise in housing prices. The find-
ings are closer to the spirit of Taylor (2007) who
suggested an early policy rate hike but differ on
the implementation strategy, as we suggest that
a gradual FFR adjustment would not have pro-
duced the desirable outcome in housing markets.
The reason why a frontloaded monetary tighten-
ing as shown in our counterfactual would have
managed to effectively deflate the housing bubble
is that this policy would more forcefully signal
the Fed’s decisiveness to follow all the necessary
actions to control the housing boom.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Considering the importance of financial sta-
bility for central bank policymakers, the issue of
whether monetary policy may help achieve this
goal is of great interest and depends on the effect
of monetary policy on asset prices. In this regard,
central banks need to know if movements in asset
prices resulting from a change in monetary pol-
icy are desirable or whether monetary policy has
negative side effects.
In this paper, we deal with this issue and
seek to uncover the impact of monetary policy
shocks on asset price bubbles. Using Bayesian
VAR models, we obtain the following empirical
results showing how asset prices may respond
to a central bank that chooses to lean against
such a bubble. First, we propose that the Fed
should consider using the CAPE as a measure
of stock market valuation. We propose a modi-
fication to CAPE to obtain an estimate of a bub-
ble. We describe the advantage of such a measure
and find evidence of nonlinear effects of mone-
tary policy on both the stock market bubble and
the fundamentals. Specifically, there is a strong
decline in the first 10 months after an increase in
the FFR, followed by a gradual increase of the
bubble term which tends towards zero in the long
term. Our findings are in line with conventional
wisdom and closely related studies (Allen, Bar-
levy, and Gale 2017; Beckers and Bernoth 2016;
Dudley 2010; Mishkin 2008, 2010) who advo-
cate that raising rates dampens bubbles rather
than amplifying them and contrast with the view
of Galí (2014) and Galí and Gambetti (2015) who
support that the size of the bubble increases
persistently in response to a tightening mone-
tary policy.
Additionally, structural analysis reveals that
UMP shocks push up asset prices, implying that
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FIGURE 14
Counterfactuals; the Impact of Tightening Monetary Policy on the Housing Market (Incremental Rise)
FIGURE 15
Counterfactuals; the Impact of Tightening Monetary Policy on the Housing Market (Frontloaded
Policy)
QE might have triggered asset price bubbles and
financial instability.
Counterfactual policy scenarios help to shed
light on the above issues by simulating sev-
eral monetary policy paths in order to assess
whether deflation (or inflation) of asset price bub-
bles is influenced by central bank policies. Our
results suggest that an aggressive monetary tight-
ening in the form of policy rate increases in
the late 1990s, in the period before the burst of
the dotcom bubble, would have limited the asset
price bubble. In addition, more recently, exten-
sive implementation of QE did lead to inflated
asset prices for a protracted period. This lat-
ter result coincides with the findings of Blot,
Hubert, and Labondance (2017) who support that
expansionary policies do fuel such bubbles. Last,
we conduct another policy scenario, this time
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to investigate the impact of monetary policy on
housing prices. Our results suggest that if the
Fed had responded much more aggressively in
2003–2004 by adopting a strong tightening pol-
icy, it would have substantially reduced the rise
in house prices.
Our general conclusion is this: if a central
bank chooses to use a tighter monetary policy
in the traditional setting of increasing Fed funds
to moderate a stock market bubble or a housing
bubble, these asset prices will respond in mod-
eration. There is no evidence of catastrophic
declines. Asset prices will initially fall and will
eventually rise again but without the risk of feed-
ing the bubble. As our counterfactuals show, the
Fed need not be concerned that by leaning against
the potential asset bubble, it is causing financial
instabilities equivalent to the bursting of the bub-
ble that it tries to regulate.
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